The Washington Accord 🤝

The Oval Office has long played a vital role in America’s political history and foreign policy.

From quiet negotiations to televised addresses, it’s where American presidents have made decisions that have had global consequences. It’s where President Nixon announced his resignation, and where President Bush addressed the nation on 9/11. 

And on June 27,  2025, the room once again stood witness — this time, to a peace agreement that could mark the beginning of the end of one of the most devastating conflicts on the African continent. 

In the Oval Office, amid the press and cameras, President Donald Trump announced the signing of a peace agreement between the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Rwanda.

A deal that could finally end more than 30 years of conflict — often called the deadliest battle since World War II — that has killed thousands of people and displaced hundreds of thousands. 

Flanked by Vice President J.D. Vance, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and the foreign ministers of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo, President Trump said, “Today, the violence and destruction come to an end, and the entire region begins a new chapter of hope and opportunity.”

Interestingly, the agreement is not just about war and peace. It is also about trade.

The agreement opens the door for the United States to access the vast mineral wealth buried beneath DRC — from cobalt and coltan to lithium and copper — resources critical to powering the modern world.

In this edition of CrossDock, we break down DRC’s central role in the global critical mineral supply chain, explore how the Rwanda–DRC conflict was shaped by control over these resources, and finally, we explore if U.S. access in the region can challenge China’s critical minerals dominance. 

 To understand why this deal matters to Washington, Beijing, and beyond, we need to rewind the clock and know how the DRC became a mining powerhouse.

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The rush for Congo’s natural resources, with the bloodshed being a byproduct, is not a new story. 

At the Berlin Conference of 1885, King Leopold II of Belgium managed to acquire the vast territory of the Congo, an area 76 times larger than Belgium. The newly acquired land was not part of the Belgian colony initially, but rather it was part of his private property. He named it the Congo Free State, but it was anything but free. 

In the 19th century, the rise of the automobile industry created a burgeoning demand for natural rubber. This led Leopold to transform the Congo into a forced labor camp dedicated to rubber production. He unleashed brutality and violence upon the people to satiate the rubber hunger of the industrial world. 

And then came mining.

Large-scale industrial mining in Congo took off in the early 20th century, largely driven by copper and eventually cobalt, in the mineral-rich southern Katanga region. It was here, in 1906, that the Belgian firm Union Minière du Haut-Katanga (UMHK) was established, backed by Belgian investors and the powerful Société Générale de Belgique, a major financial conglomerate. 

UMHK quickly became one of the most profitable mining companies globally. By the 1920s, it was extracting massive volumes of copper, a metal essential for electrical wiring, industrial machinery, and later, ammunition. According to a report by the Natural Resource Governance Institute, UMHK’s production increased from a meager 2,000 tons in 1912 to an average of 86,000 tons in the 1920s. 

As the 20th century progressed, cobalt — initially a byproduct of copper processing — gained strategic importance. During World War II and the Cold War, cobalt became crucial for producing hardened steel, jet engine alloys, and components for nuclear weapons. 

By 1960, Katanga’s mines were contributing more than half of the world’s cobalt supply and a significant share of its copper. In that year, Congo produced 300,675 tons of copper and 8,222 tons of cobalt, according to National Resource Governance Institute data. This was also the year Congo gained independence.

In 1966, President Mobutu Sese Seko launched a sweeping nationalization campaign. UMHK was seized and transformed into Gécamines, a state-owned enterprise that would control most of Congo’s mineral wealth for the next few decades. At the same time, Gécamines was mismanaged, underinvested, and often used to finance Mobutu’s authoritarian rule.

As war swept through Congo in the late 1990s, Gécamines collapsed. The downfall of Gécamines led Congo’s government to face growing pressure from international financial institutions to liberalize its economy. 

In 2002, with the guidance from the World Bank and the IMF, the Democratic Republic of Congo passed a new mining code — a landmark piece of legislation that fundamentally reshaped the country's mining sector.

It slashed state ownership requirements, simplified licensing procedures, offered ten-year tax stability clauses, and introduced generous profit repatriation terms for investors. The idea was to revive both Congo and its struggling mining industry. 

The DRC opened its doors and waited for guests. And the dragon paid a visit. 

Backed by Beijing’s state-owned banks and fueled by the ambitions of the Belt and Road Initiative, Chinese companies signed sweeping infrastructure-for-minerals deals with Congo.

One of the most consequential deals came in 2007, when Congo signed a $6 billion resource-for-infrastructure agreement with China — often referred to as the "Sicomines deal" — exchanging future copper and cobalt production for Chinese-built roads, hospitals, and railways. 

While the deal promised development, experts say it tilted power heavily in China’s favor, locking Congo into decades-long commitments with little transparency or oversight.

By the 2010s, China had begun to control the majority of industrial cobalt mining in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Western mining firms, once dominant, began to pull back or were outcompeted by Chinese companies. For example, in 2016, Freeport-McMoRan, desperate to offload debt from a failed oil and gas gamble, sold its stake in the Tenke Fungurume mine to China Molybdenum for $2.65 billion. 

Today, China accounts for over 50% of the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s copper production, mainly through joint ventures with Gécamines or outright ownership. 

Similarly, Chinese companies control 70%–80% of all industrial cobalt mining operations in the DRC. In fact, one of the largest cobalt mines in the world, Tenke Fungurume, is owned by China Molybdenum (CMOC). 

Not just production, but China also dominates the refining part — a key link in the critical mineral supply chain. In fact, China has the largest cobalt refining and smelting capacity in the world. 

Over 80% of the world’s cobalt is refined in China, according to the China Cobalt Market Report 2024, and 90% of that comes from the Congolese mines. 

Similarly, according to United Nations Trade Development data, China refines nearly 40% of global copper production. 

This brings us to the next question: why are these minerals essential, and how much is DRC producing them? 

In today’s world, critical minerals are the backbone of nearly every modern technology. Take the example of Copper, it is a crucial part of the clean energy infrastructure, wiring our homes, vehicles, and electric grids. Cobalt and lithium are the beating heart of rechargeable batteries, powering everything from smartphones to electric vehicles and industrial energy storage.  

Next is Coltan, a key source of tantalum, a metal primarily used to manufacture tantalum capacitors, a vital component in smartphones, laptops, gaming consoles, and other electronic devices. 

As countries race to decarbonize and digitize, the demand for these materials has skyrocketed.

And this is where DRC comes into play.

The DRC is home to one of the richest geological endowments on Earth, holding $24 trillion worth of minerals beneath its surface, according to ARSP, the DRC’s private sector regulatory body.

DRC is also a powerhouse when it comes to global critical minerals production. In 2024 alone, it produced an estimated 3.3 million metric tons of copper, accounting for more than 11% of global output, according to the Congolese Ministry of Mines. That makes it the second-largest producer in the world after Chile, and ahead of Peru. 

But it’s not just about volume. DRC’s copper is among the highest-grade in the world—often over four times richer than the global average—making it especially attractive for high-performance industrial and electrical applications. 

According to the International Trade Administration’s Country Commercial Guide, the ore grades in certain DRC mines exceed 3% — significantly higher than the global average of 0.6% to 0.8%.

The next crucial critical mineral is cobalt. The DRC is the undisputed global leader in cobalt production, responsible for roughly 70–80% of the world’s supply according to U.S. Geological Survey Data. 

Then there’s coltan—the dull black ore that yields tantalum. Congo doesn’t just produce a large share of the world’s tantalum; it also holds an estimated 60% of global reserves, making it a long-term player in the supply chain. Meanwhile, lithium—the lifeblood of nearly every rechargeable battery—is fast emerging as the next frontier. 

In short, the DRC is not just a major supplier; it is the critical mineral engine powering the world’s clean energy and tech revolutions. 

Sadly, DRC’s mineral wealth is both a blessing and a curse. Let’s explain why. 

While Congo’s vast mineral wealth powers electric vehicles, smartphones, and clean energy systems across the globe, at home, it continues to fuel conflict. In the country’s volatile eastern provinces — especially North Kivu and Ituri — control over cobalt, coltan, and gold isn’t just a matter of resources. It’s a matter of war.

Rebel groups like M23, widely reported to be backed by Rwanda, have taken over mining regions, turning them into profit centers for war. Multiple U.N. and NGO investigations confirm that Rwanda has armed, trained, and sheltered M23 fighters, helping them seize critical mining zones. From there, the minerals — often extracted under violent or illegal conditions — are smuggled across the border into Rwanda.

What happens next is a masterclass in laundering conflict minerals. 

Rwanda, despite having little to no domestic reserves of cobalt or tantalum, reported mineral exports worth over $1.1 billion in 2023, up from $772 million the previous year, according to data from the Rwanda Mines, Petroleum, and Gas Board. 

In 2024, Luxembourg-based commodity trader Traxys bought 280 tonnes of coltan from Rwanda, according to a Global Witness investigation. Much of that coltan is believed to have been smuggled from rebel-held areas in DRC, including Rubaya — a key mining hub now under M23 control. This illustrates how critical minerals smuggled from the DRC support Rwanda’s economy and trade. 

It’s not just private companies. In early 2024, the European Union signed a strategic partnership with Rwanda to secure raw materials, including tantalum, essential for the EU’s green transition. 

But that partnership was soon criticized for lacking safeguards against sourcing minerals from conflict zones. 

Interestingly, the issue goes beyond Europe. According to a 2021 USGS report, the United States sources more than a third of its tantalum from Rwanda, five times more than it imports directly from the DRC, where much of the mineral is actually mined.

An estimated 20–25% of cobalt and coltan mined in the DRC is smuggled out through illegal routes, bypassing customs and traceability systems. According to UN and Global Witness reports, these conflict minerals are commonly trafficked into Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and Tanzania, where they are repackaged and exported as locally sourced.

So, can this new treaty actually end the smuggling of critical minerals and stop the DRC–Rwanda conflict?

That’s the hope

The DRC has taken a page out of the Ukraine–U.S. playbook: it’s putting its vast reserves of critical minerals on the table in exchange for security from the U.S.

But this deal isn’t just about minerals for peace.

It could also redraw the global map of critical mineral access. For the first time in years, the United States has secured a direct foothold in the DRC’s critical mineral sector — an area that, until now, has been dominated almost entirely by China.

With the involvement of the U.S. in the region, the power dynamics of Africa’s mineral economy could shift dramatically. 

China has long enjoyed near-total dominance, both in mining rights and refining capacity, across the DRC and much of the continent. But a peace deal that opens up access to U.S. and Western companies could rebalance the playing field.

In fact, it can fast-track Western projects on the African continent. For example, the  Lobito Corridor, a U.S.- and EU-backed railway linking Angola, the DRC, and Zambia to Atlantic ports — designed to move critical minerals westward without touching Chinese-controlled infrastructure can come to fruition. 

But these things are easier said than done. 

Even with the promise of peace and new access, the road ahead for the United States in the DRC is anything but smooth, according to experts. The real bottleneck in the critical mineral supply chain lies not in mining but in refining. 

And that’s where China still dominates. Today, China controls more than 70% of global cobalt refining and a significantly larger share of processing capacity for rare earth minerals. Simply put, even if the U.S. extracts the ore, it would still need to send it—ironically—to China for processing, unless it builds or secures alternative facilities elsewhere. 

Another challenge is investment. To truly leverage DRC’s mineral wealth, the U.S. must persuade a broader swath of private investors. But convincing boardrooms to invest billions into a historically unstable, conflict-ridden region won’t be easy.

Then there’s the uncomfortable truth: the peace deal doesn’t include M23, the very militia that controls some of Congo’s most valuable mining zones. Without their buy-in—or military defeat — it’s unclear how the agreement will be enforced where it matters most. Even those optimistic about the deal admit that its long-term durability remains in question. 

For the first time in decades, the United States now has access to the Democratic Republic of Congo’s massive reserves of critical minerals — a region that has, until now, been firmly under China’s influence. If used well, this access could shift the balance in global supply chains. 

But making this peace agreement work won’t be easy.

The DRC is still one of the most unstable places in the world — home to armed militias, weak governance, and widespread corruption. Even with access on paper, many experts believe the real challenge for the U.S. will be turning that into actual, secure, and fair production on the ground.

And the biggest question is, how will China react to America stepping into a territory it has controlled for years?

Yes, this peace agreement could finally help end the conflict between DRC and Rwanda — but it might also mark the beginning of a much bigger fight over who controls the world’s critical minerals.

This newsletter was written by Shyam Gowtham

Thank you for reading. We’ll see you at the next edition!