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Ports are not just points of entry; they are points of power. According to data from the United States Maritime Administration, there are over 300 commercial ports in the United States. These ports are critical entry points for the nearly $2.3 trillion worth of goods that move in and out of the country by sea each year. From automobiles to apparel, from corn to computers, most of what enters or leaves the U.S. by sea passes through these terminals. 

And powering these vital ports are tall mechanical giants — cranes. Specifically, ship-to-shore cranes that hoist steel containers on and off vessels with laser precision. But here’s the twist: More than 80% of those cranes at U.S. ports come from a single Chinese company — ZPMC.

​​In fact, ZPMC or Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy Industries Company Limited controls nearly 70% of the global market for ship-to-shore cranes. 

This is at a time when the U.S. and China are locked in a broader geopolitical contest — one that spans supply chains, industrial policy, and digital infrastructure.

In this issue of CrossDock, we break down the journey of ZPMC, how it quietly embedded itself in the heart of America’s ports, the national security concerns that have arisen around it, and what the US is doing to address them.

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How was ZPMC formed? 

After years of economic isolation, China began opening up to foreign trade and investment in 1978. The shift was transformative for China and for the world. Once the doors opened, China embraced globalization like a fish to water. 

Let’s illustrate it with numbers. 

In 1978, China’s total trade volume was just $20.6 billion. By 1988, it had surged to $115 billion. As trade boomed, China’s share of global exports climbed from 0.9% in 1980 to nearly 2% by the end of the decade, laying the foundation for China to become the global manufacturing powerhouse it is today.

But there was a problem. 

​​China’s ports were moving more goods than ever, but the infrastructure to load and unload massive cargo ships hadn’t kept pace. At the time, almost all advanced ship-to-shore (STS) cranes came from abroad—Liebherr of Germany, Konecranes of Finland, and Mitsui of Japan. These cranes were not only expensive but also subject to long delivery times. For a country hungry to become a global export hub, depending on foreign machinery for trade lifelines was a vulnerability.

So, this necessity led to the creation of ZPMC. 

In 1992, Shanghai Zhenhua Port Machinery Company — later known simply as ZPMC — was set up as a fully owned arm of China Communications Construction Company (CCCC), one of China’s big state-run infrastructure players. The mission was twofold: help upgrade China’s aging ports, and eventually take Chinese crane-making global.

That day came quickly. Just a year later, in 1993, ZPMC landed its first international order from the Port of Vancouver. It was a huge breakthrough, and more deals followed in Hong Kong, Singapore, and the Middle East as the company moved swiftly into global markets.

The company entered the American market in 1994 with an order from the Port of Miami—a key win that paved the way for its expansion into North America. Soon, the Port of Tacoma and Port of Oakland signed on in 1996, and by 1997, ZPMC had landed a major contract with the Port of Long Beach. In just a few years, ZPMC had gone from a newcomer to a serious player in both U.S. ports and internationally. 

By 2001, ZPMC had gone public on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and emerged as the global leader in the crane market, which European, North American, and Japanese manufacturers had previously dominated. 

By 2007, just 15 years after its founding, ZPMC held over 70% of the global market share for container cranes.. 

But, how did ZPMC take over the crane world? Let’s break it down for you. 

Built to Win

From the very beginning, its playbook was straightforward: figure out what customers needed, then deliver it faster, cheaper, and at a scale no one else could match. 

For example, in the 1990s, ZPMC’s founding chairman, the charismatic Guan Tongxian, and his team toured ports around the world, watching how equipment was used and maintained. They quickly identified a flaw in the existing system: legacy crane makers were charging a premium not only for machines, but also for simple spare parts.

ZPMC flipped the model. They replicated commonly used components, produced them at a fraction of the cost using China’s low-cost labor advantage, and sold them at prices that left their competitors scrambling. 

For example, a ship-to-shore crane from ZPMC typically costs between $10 million and $14 million, according to industry reports. In contrast, similar cranes from European manufacturers can cost over $20 million. That price gap — sometimes exceeding 40% — gave ZPMC a significant advantage in winning bids, especially for ports operating under tight infrastructure budgets.

Additionally, while other firms profited from expensive service contracts, ZPMC began offering lifelong guarantees on parts — an unheard-of move at the time.

But ZPMC wasn’t only focused on cutting costs. It also put effort into improving its technology. In 2004, it introduced a double-lifting crane that could simultaneously move two containers. This helped reduce ship turnaround times and made operations more efficient, giving ZPMC added credibility as a serious engineering player, not just a low-cost supplier.

A key factor in ZPMC’s success was its effective logistics management. It built its own fleet of semi-submersible ships, allowing it to deliver cranes fully assembled—a service no other manufacturer offered at the time. This slashed delivery times dramatically, allowing ports to begin operations almost immediately after installation.

According to its website, ZPMC now has a global footprint spanning 108 countries and regions, with its equipment operating in over 300 ports worldwide. In 2024, the company generated approximately $48 billion in total revenue.

Sounds like ZPMC had everything figured out. A product that is more affordable and more profitable than its competitors.

An unmatched monopoly in the market. But then the Pentagon raised a red flag. According to officials, these cranes, standing tall across the American coastline, might be doing more than just lifting containers!

Trojan Horse

In 2021, national security concerns around ZPMC escalated when the FBI raided a Chinese cargo vessel delivering cranes to the Port of Baltimore. During the raid, agents reportedly discovered communications equipment embedded within the cranes—devices that could potentially be used for surveillance or data transmission. 

That same year, a classified assessment by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) warned that Chinese-made cranes could enable Beijing to monitor the movement of U.S. military cargo or even disrupt port operations entirely.

Two years later, in June 2023, the House Committee on Homeland Security and the House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition between the U.S. and the Chinese Communist Party launched a joint investigation into these risks. The findings were shocking.

Despite U.S. port operators explicitly declining the option for remote diagnostic features, several ZPMC cranes arrived pre-installed with cellular modems — hardware that was never included in the original contracts. 

Port authorities had neither requested nor approved their installation. According to the congressional investigation, the modems served no operational purpose and instead created obscure backdoors that could bypass standard cybersecurity protections, potentially allowing remote data access. While ZPMC claimed the modems were used to collect usage data, their unauthorized inclusion raised major red flags.

In fact, security officials told the committee it is an “open secret” that ZPMC routinely pressures port operators to allow remote access to crane systems under the guise of diagnostics. Many buyers, seeking discounted pricing or stronger warranty terms, feel compelled to accept.

The committee’s report also noted that ZPMC had repeatedly requested remote access to cranes at U.S. ports, especially on the West Coast. If granted, such access could legally be shared with Chinese intelligence agencies, due to China’s national security laws—specifically Article 35 of the PRC’s Cybersecurity Law, which mandates that companies like ZPMC must share source code and system access with the Chinese government. 

And this could be deeply concerning because at several key terminals, civilian ports sit side by side with naval bases. Imagine Chinese-made cranes with the technical ability to track the movement of US Navy vessels?

Additionally, there is a broader geopolitical concern here. For example, in a potential future conflict, the Chinese government could leverage ZPMC’s presence in U.S. ports to disrupt logistics operations, hinder military deployments, or conduct espionage under the radar.

“It is deeply troubling that the vast majority of ship‑to‑shore cranes at U.S. ports are manufactured by the Chinese state‑owned company, ZPMC. The United States must not give the CCP another way to infiltrate our critical infrastructure, conduct surveillance and espionage, steal intellectual property, and potentially throttle our port activity altogether,” stated Rep. Mike Gallagher, chair of the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, in the report.

Joint investigative report on the findings of ZPMC’s influence on the US ports

However, ZPMC refuted the claims made in the report. 

In response to the congressional findings, ZPMC posted a statement on its website, saying: “ZPMC takes these allegations seriously and considers that such reports, without a sufficient review of the facts, can easily mislead the public. The cranes provided by ZPMC pose no cybersecurity risk to any port.”

So, what’s the United States doing about ZPMC’s influence on US ports? 

Power Play

The U.S. may not be able to break ZPMC’s dominance overnight, but it’s making it clear that it no longer wants to rely on — or be tied to — critical infrastructure built by a Chinese state-owned company.

The first step towards that path was in February 2024, when the Biden administration announced a $20 billion plan to strengthen port infrastructure and revive domestic crane manufacturing.

But things picked up in 2025. The U.S. Trade Representative proposed slapping a 100% tariff on Chinese-made ship-to-shore cranes—effectively pricing ZPMC out of the market. ZPMC fired back, warning the move “could put shutdowns... and lead to supply chain chaos and major damage to the U.S. economy.”

US ports that use Chinese-made cranes



“The tariffs will significantly increase costs for U.S. port customers, and lead to low efficiencies in port supply chain operations due to material reliance on aging equipment or even a complete halt of port operations,” ZPMC told USTR.

And ZPMC could be right. 

Currently, U.S. ports are heavily reliant on ZPMC-made cranes. These machines are central to port activity, and without them, nothing moves, literally. You can’t unload containers from ships and send them off to retailers, and you can’t load American exports onto vessels heading overseas. In short, these cranes are the backbone of the U.S. supply chain.

And that’s why this new Senate bill is such an important development. On June 10, 2025, the Senate advanced the Maritime Supply Chain Security Act, one day after it passed the House. 

The legislation allows U.S. ports to use federal grant funding to replace Chinese-made cranes and control systems with equipment manufactured domestically or sourced from trusted allied countries. It’s a direct policy response to growing concerns over cybersecurity threats and the strategic risks associated with relying on infrastructure provided by Chinese state-owned enterprises, such as ZPMC.

Other potential competitors are eyeing the lucrative U.S. crane market as ZPMC faces rising scrutiny. According to reports, South Korean firms like HD Hyundai and Doosan have begun courting U.S. ports with alternative crane solutions.

Global Concern

Interestingly, these concerns aren’t limited to Washington.

In Europe, security officials have begun raising similar alarms. A 2023 study commissioned by the European Parliament identified ZPMC cranes as part of a wider dependence on Chinese-built infrastructure at major EU ports. 

India has likewise grown increasingly cautious. ZPMC cranes have been installed at major terminals, including Jawaharlal Nehru Port and the Vizhinjam International Seaport — India’s first mega deep-water transshipment hub.  

Following its 2020 border clash with China, New Delhi tightened procurement rules, requiring national security clearance for infrastructure bids from neighboring countries (read China). The move effectively curtailed future tenders for Chinese firms, such as ZPMC.

One of the primary reasons ZPMC has such a strong global presence is its competitive pricing. The company is able to sell its cranes at much lower prices than its global competitors. While a crane from a European or Japanese manufacturer might cost around $20 million, ZPMC often offers similar cranes for almost half that amount.

So, how are they able to do this? 

Backed by Dragon

ZPMC’s ability to offer such low prices stems from one significant advantage: it’s reportedly backed by the Chinese government. According to reports, as a state-owned company, ZPMC has access to low-cost, long-term loans from major Chinese banks, including China Exim and China Development Bank. For example, in 2009, China Exim provided a $16 million loan to assist Brazil in purchasing ZPMC cranes for the Port of Rio Grande. 

On top of that, ZPMC benefits from China’s low labor costs and heavily subsidized steel industry. The company employs more than 30,000 workers and builds everything—from parts to final assembly—at massive, centralized factories in Shanghai. This kind of scale helps cut costs even more. With all these advantages, ZPMC can sell its cranes at nearly half the price of its Western competitors and still make a profit. 

Cost of a Ship-to-Shore Container Crane in USD Millions

ZPMC is also part of a much bigger Chinese dream project: the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). 

Through BRI, China isn’t just building roads and railways — it’s building global influence. And ZPMC plays a key role in that plan. The company’s cranes are planted around the world as part of China’s push to control key trade routes and port infrastructure. 

For example, in Sri Lanka, ZPMC cranes operate at the Hambantota Port, a major facility now leased to China for 99 years. In Africa, China has helped finance and build over 50 ports, with many of them using ZPMC equipment. In Latin America, billions of dollars are being invested in new Chinese-backed ports, such as the one in Chancay, Peru.

Final Words

Despite intensifying scrutiny from U.S. lawmakers, the threat of tariff imposition, and rising global concern over cybersecurity risks, ZPMC continues to expand its footprint across global ports. In 2024, the company reported ¥344.56 billion in annual revenue—approximately $47.9 billion USD—marking a 4.6% increase over the previous year.

Much of that growth is driven by continued demand in emerging markets, where ZPMC’s pricing, financing options, and speed of delivery remain difficult to match. Even in developed economies, where political concerns are mounting, many port operators remain locked into existing contracts or dependent on parts and servicing from the company.

ZPMC’s case illustrates a broader trend: the growing entanglement of logistics infrastructure with national security policy. Cranes, terminals, and control systems are no longer viewed solely as commercial equipment but as critical assets with strategic implications.

This newsletter was written by Shyam Gowtham

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