8 Critical Minerals with the Highest Supply Chain Risk

From smartphones to submarines, electric vehicles to energy grids—our modern world runs on a hidden layer of materials. These are critical minerals: niche metals with outsized influence over everything from tech innovation to national security. But what happens when the supply chains for these minerals are concentrated in just one or two countries? Or worse, in fragile or adversarial jurisdictions?

In this Logisticle, we explore eight critical minerals with the highest supply chain concentration risk. These are not just materials. They're strategic chokepoints—where geopolitical tension, resource nationalism, and industrial vulnerability collide.

Few mineral groups are as geopolitically charged—and supply chain–exposed—as rare earth elements. Despite the name, REEs like neodymium, dysprosium, and terbium are relatively abundant in the Earth's crust. The real chokepoint lies in processing. As of 2024, China controls nearly 90% of global rare earth refining capacity, positioning itself as the undisputed gatekeeper of this critical midstream segment.

These metals are indispensable for modern technology. Permanent magnets made from neodymium and dysprosium power everything from electric vehicle motors and wind turbines to precision-guided missiles and fighter jets. The Pentagon classifies them as essential for national defense, and yet, the U.S. has minimal domestic refining capability. The sole U.S. rare earth mine—Mountain Pass in California—extracts concentrates but relies on China for further processing.

This imbalance came into sharp focus in 2010 when China briefly halted rare earth exports to Japan over a maritime dispute. More recently, Beijing imposed new export restrictions on key REEs in 2023, sending shockwaves through global tech and defense sectors. Western nations are scrambling to build alternative supply chains, with Australia, the U.S., and the EU funding refining capacity and recycling programs.

Still, the timeline to diversification is long—and China’s stranglehold remains firm. As industries electrify and militaries modernize, rare earths remain a strategic supply chain Achilles’ heel.

Cobalt is the unsung hero powering the battery revolution—but it's also one of the most ethically and geographically fragile minerals in the global supply chain. Over 70% of the world’s cobalt is mined in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), a country plagued by political instability, corruption, and ongoing concerns over human rights violations, including the use of child labor in artisanal mining.

Yet the risk doesn’t end at the mine. Once extracted, more than 65% of cobalt is refined in China, giving Beijing control over both the processing and pricing of this crucial input for electric vehicle (EV) batteries, smartphones, and aerospace alloys.

This dual chokepoint—upstream in the DRC and midstream in China—creates a uniquely brittle supply chain. Any disruption, whether from civil unrest in Central Africa or export controls from Beijing, could send shockwaves through global EV production. Already, the push for cleaner energy has clashed with messy realities on the ground. Western automakers, under pressure to clean up their supply chains, are struggling to find scalable, traceable alternatives.

Efforts are underway to diversify: Indonesia, Australia, and Canada are ramping up production, and companies like Tesla and Glencore are pursuing direct offtake deals. But new projects face long lead times and high capital costs.

For now, cobalt remains a critical—and highly vulnerable—link in the energy transition chain.

You can’t build a lithium-ion battery without graphite. It makes up the anode—about 28% of a typical EV battery by weight—yet rarely gets the spotlight. That’s changing fast, and for good reason: China refines over 90% of the world’s battery-grade graphite, making it one of the most dangerously concentrated materials in the clean energy supply chain.

While graphite is mined in multiple countries—China, Mozambique, Madagascar, and Canada—the real chokepoint lies in midstream processing. Natural flake graphite must be purified and shaped into spherical graphite before it’s usable in EV batteries. China dominates this refining step, thanks to aggressive industrial subsidies, low environmental standards, and early investment in processing capacity.

In 2023, China made things even tighter: it imposed export restrictions on certain graphite products, citing “national security.” The move rattled global automakers and battery producers, many of whom hadn’t built diversified supplier networks.

The U.S., EU, and Japan have all since classified graphite as a strategic mineral. Projects in Tanzania, Canada, and Australia aim to ramp up production and local refining, but the timelines are long and expensive.

For now, China’s grip on battery-grade graphite remains unmatched. And as EV demand surges—alongside battery storage systems for renewables—the pressure on this single point of failure is only increasing.

Antimony may not be as well-known as lithium or cobalt, but its strategic value is quietly immense—and its supply chain is one of the most concentrated in the world. Used primarily as a flame retardant and in alloys for semiconductors, ammunition, and military-grade materials, antimony is classified as a critical mineral in the U.S., EU, and several allied nations.

Here’s the catch: over 54% of global antimony production comes from China, and much of the rest—from Russia and Tajikistan—is either geopolitically sensitive or unstable. The U.S. currently has no domestic antimony mining or refining capacity, making it entirely dependent on imports for this essential input.

Antimony’s role in national defense cannot be overstated. It’s used in armor-piercing rounds, night vision goggles, and other military technologies. A disruption in supply—whether due to export controls, conflict, or trade restrictions—could impact everything from electronics manufacturing to ammunition production.

What makes antimony even riskier is its byproduct nature: it’s often recovered during gold or base metal processing, making it harder to scale production independently. With few substitution options and limited recycling infrastructure, the U.S. and its allies are in a tight spot.

Exploration projects in Australia and a revival of the long-dormant Stibnite Mine in Idaho are steps toward supply diversification—but they’re years away from meaningful output.

For now, antimony remains a textbook case of a mineral with high strategic value and dangerously narrow sourcing.

Gallium sits at the bleeding edge of innovation—and the epicenter of a geopolitical tug-of-war. This soft, silvery metal is a key ingredient in compound semiconductors used in 5G telecoms, solar panels, LEDs, and military radar systems. Its importance to both commercial electronics and advanced weaponry has skyrocketed in recent years.

But so has the risk. Over 90% of the world’s gallium is produced in China, mostly as a byproduct of aluminum refining. The U.S. currently has no domestic primary gallium production, and almost all imports come from China, Germany, and Ukraine. That’s a fragile mix—and Beijing knows it.

In July 2023, China imposed sweeping export controls on gallium and germanium, citing “national security” amid rising tensions with the U.S. and Europe. The result? A surge in prices, disrupted shipments, and a scramble by Western buyers to find alternative sources or stockpile supplies. The move was widely seen as a direct response to U.S. semiconductor export restrictions.

Gallium is notoriously difficult to mine directly, and building new refining capacity is costly and time-consuming. Some R&D efforts are exploring recycling from LED waste streams or recovering gallium from coal fly ash, but these remain niche.

As the global economy grows more reliant on advanced electronics, gallium has become a pressure point in the West’s technology supply chain—and China has its finger firmly on the valve.

Germanium is the mineral behind the curtain—quietly enabling technologies from fiber-optic networks and infrared optics to solar panels and satellite imaging. It’s also become a key material for military-grade night vision and advanced chip manufacturing. But while demand grows, supply remains opaque and dangerously concentrated.

As of 2024, about 70% of the world’s refined germanium comes from China, with the rest split among countries like Canada, Belgium, and Russia. Much like gallium, germanium is a byproduct—produced during the smelting of zinc and coal fly ash—making it difficult to scale up independently. This secondary nature adds complexity to sourcing and forecasting.

In tandem with gallium, China imposed export restrictions on germanium in mid-2023, citing national security concerns. The move jolted global markets, with germanium prices spiking over 70%, reaching around $2,280 per kilogram. Defense contractors and photonics companies scrambled to secure an alternative supply or recycle existing stock.

The U.S. once produced germanium domestically but ceased operations over a decade ago due to cost and environmental concerns. Today, it is entirely reliant on imports and has classified germanium as critical to national defense.

Alternative supply from Canada and the EU is in development, but new capacity won’t come online fast. With its use in both green energy and military optics, germanium represents a classic case of a high-tech bottleneck under geopolitical pressure.

Niobium is a quiet powerhouse in modern infrastructure and defense. Used primarily in high-strength, low-alloy (HSLA) steel, it’s essential for pipelines, jet engines, MRI machines, and space and nuclear technologies. Its unique ability to strengthen steel without adding significant weight makes it indispensable in sectors where both durability and performance are non-negotiable.

But its supply chain? Alarmingly narrow.

As of 2024, over 85% of the world’s niobium comes from a single mine in Brazil—the Araxá mine owned by Companhia Brasileira de Metalurgia e Mineração (CBMM). Canada and Australia offer minor production, but global dependency on one supplier remains extreme. That’s not just geographic concentration—it’s near-monopoly risk.

While Brazil is a stable democracy and CBMM is a well-managed, privately held firm, the lack of alternative production or refining capacity globally puts key industries at strategic risk. Any disruption—be it political unrest, trade restrictions, or natural disasters—could upend steel manufacturing timelines and prices across the world.

There’s no major substitution for niobium in HSLA steel without sacrificing performance. And while some exploration is underway in Canada and Africa, permitting and capital timelines stretch into years.

For now, the global supply of niobium hangs on a single point—and the stakes are far higher than most industries realize.

Tantalum is the backbone of the digital age—used in the capacitors that regulate power in smartphones, laptops, data centers, and military electronics. Compact, heat-resistant, and corrosion-proof, it’s essential for miniaturized, high-performance electronics.

But the supply chain? Fraught with risk.

Roughly 40% of the world’s tantalum is mined in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), with significant contributions from Rwanda and Burundi. Much of this supply comes from artisanal mines operating under weak governance, minimal oversight, and often in conflict zones. The mineral is most commonly extracted as coltan (columbite–tantalite), a source material that has been linked to funding armed groups—earning tantalum a place among the so-called “conflict minerals.”

To make matters worse, China dominates tantalum refining, adding a second layer of concentration risk at the midstream stage. Western electronics and defense firms face growing pressure to ensure ethical sourcing, but alternatives remain limited.

Efforts to clean up the supply chain—like traceability programs and responsible sourcing initiatives—have gained traction, but challenges persist. Australia and Brazil offer more stable mining routes, and tech firms are exploring recycling from e-waste, but global reliance on the DRC remains high.

Tantalum exemplifies a double-bind: geopolitical instability upstream and processing dominance downstream, in a mineral that powers nearly every connected device in the modern world.

Supply chains don’t break evenly—they snap at their weakest link. And for many of the world’s most advanced technologies, that weakest link is upstream or midstream mineral processing. Whether it’s a single mine in Brazil (niobium), a refining monopoly in China (graphite, rare earths), or a conflict zone in Central Africa (cobalt, tantalum), the risks are systemic.

Governments and corporations are waking up. Stockpiles are being built. Recycling is gaining traction. New mines are being fast-tracked in friendlier jurisdictions. But the clock is ticking, especially as clean energy demand accelerates and geopolitical fractures deepen.